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Migrants at School: Educational Inequality and Social 
Interaction in the UK and Germany
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We test potential social costs of educational inequality by analysing the influence of spatial 
and social segregation on educational achievements. In particular, based on recent PISA 
data sets from the UK and Germany, we investigate whether good neighbourhoods with a 
relatively high stock of social capital lead to larger ‘social multipliers’ than neighbourhoods 
with low social capital. Estimated ‘social multipliers’ are higher for the German early tracking 
schooling system than for comprehensive schools in the UK. After aggregating data and 
employing the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the results suggest that the educational gap 
between natives and migrants is mainly due to the ‘endowment effect’ provided by the 
socioeconomic background of parents and cultural capital at home. Some adverse 
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1. Introduction  
 
Both in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in France and Germany, inequality between 
educational groups has increased recently: In the United States and Great Britain, 
wage inequality between and within educational groups has risen dramatically since 
about the 1970s. In France and Germany, there has been hardly any change in wage 
inequality between educational groups until the end of the last century (see 
Fitzenberger, 1999; Kahn, 2000; Acemoglu, 2003), but wage gaps between educated 
and low skilled groups do widen in Germany during the most recent years (see 
Dustmann et al., 2007). Moreover, the distribution of employment and unemployment 
incidence across educational groups became more unequal to the detriment of the 
lower educated (see Entorf, 1996; Fitzenberger, 1999; Puhani, 2004, for Germany; 
Machin, 1997, and Machin and Van Reenen, 1998, for the UK).  
Because the low education groups seem to suffer the most from economic shocks 
such as the current global financial crisis, questions of education increasingly grab the 
attention of educational scientists, labour economists as well as politicians. The 
debate immediately relates to the access and amount of education for disadvantaged 
groups, and prompts research aiming at an analysis of the nature and causes of the 
persisting lack of social mobility, and an examination of the avenues of improving the 
social mobility of less privileged children (through schooling and higher education). 
This seems to be very low in Germany and the UK, as results in Entorf and Minoiu 
(2005) have shown: The so called socioeconomic gradient, which reveals the 
intergenerational correlation between the socioeconomic status of parents and the 
educational performance of children, is particular high in both countries. Among all 
nine countries under comparison
2, the correlation in Germany is highest and the one 
in the UK ranks second. A further common feature of both countries is that those 
students having an immigration background are among the student population at risk 
to be affected by educational inequality. 
Most of the existing contributions focus on the relatively poor socioeconomic 
background of migrants (see, among others, Gang and Zimmermann, 2000; Frick and 
Wagner, 2001; Bauer and Riphahn, 2007). The debate has been given renewed 
impetus after the results of the first PISA surveys were published (Programme for 
International Student Assessment, see OECD, 2001, for first results), in particular in 
Germany, where the bad performance of German students was perceived as a national 
disaster (the ‘PISA shock’).
3 More detailed international comparisons reveal that the 
                                                 
2 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA, Finland, France, Germany, UK and Sweden. 
3 By contrast, the surprisingly good performance at the first (2000) PISA reading test was considered 
with national pride in the UK, as can be seen from the following quote:  ‘Being above Germany in the 
education league table might not be as much fun as beating them at football, but it could prove more 
important for the UK in the long run’ (The Times, 7 December 2001; quoted in Weigel, 2004).  After 
two disappointing PISA rounds in 2003 and 2006 (for instance, in maths UK scored 529 in 2000, 508 
in 2003, and only 495 in 2006, similar drops can be observed for reading and science scores; at the   3
performance of children with a parental migration background differs strongly across 
countries (Entorf and Minoiu, 2005). By using educational achievement data from 
other sources (TIMMS and PIRLS), Hanushek and Wössmann (2006) as well as 
Schnepf (2007) confirm that besides highly variant socioeconomic backgrounds also 
language problems can be considered a main source of internationally differing 
performances of migrant students. After analysing immigrants’ disadvantage of ten 
high immigration countries she concludes that natives are on average as much as one 
grade ahead in their maths skills compared to immigrants in Germany and 
Switzerland. The situation is different in traditional countries of immigration (New 
Zealand, Canada, Australia) where the more privileged parental backgrounds of 
(selected) migrants lead to less significant or even positive (Canada) differences 
between educational achievements scores of migrants and natives (see Entorf and 
Minoiu, 2005). In the UK, where the majority of migrants comes from India or 
Western countries such as Ireland and USA, evidence in Entorf and Minoiu (2005) 
and Schnepf (2007) reveal that there is a gap only for those migrant students who 
have a non-English language background. 
However, all studies reveal that there remains a considerable educational 
disadvantage of immigrants not explained by observed individual heterogeneity. This 
indicates that immigrants face further barriers that might be related to unobserved 
heterogeneity (note that most studies quoted above are based on cross-sectional data) 
and unfavourable factors arising from their lacking integration into (Western) 
societies. For instance, given that immigrants are concentrated in large cities and the 
suburban areas, equality of educational opportunities is limited by spatial and social 
segregation and the resulting emergence of ‘good’ or ‘bad neighbourhoods’, i.e. by 
‘peer effects’. Peer effects in the context of schooling have been studied by Hoxby 
(2000), Hanushek et al. (2003), among others.  
However, a comparatively neglected factor which still seems highly relevant for the 
composition of peers is the impact of schooling systems. Some authors discuss 
whether, in addition, the early tracking into different ability schools at the age of 10 as 
in Austria and Germany might have negative consequences on school performance for 
children who enter school with language and social deficits, a high proportion of 
whom come from families with a migration background (see Dustmann, 2004, for a 
critical assessment of the selective German school systems). Under such 
circumstances the question of peer effects cannot be disentangled from the influence 
of prevailing national schooling systems.  
                                                                                                                                            
same time the German maths score increased from 490 in 2000, to 503 in 2003, and to 504 in 2006) 
comments on PISA scores by the media have changed: ’A league table to worry us all.’, ‘The suggested 
decline of the UK scores [...] raises questions about the direction of educational policy in England over 
the past 10 years’ (The Guardian , 8 January 2008). 
   4
Entorf and Lauk (2008) have recently investigated the role that peer effects and social 
integration of migrants play for their schooling achievements in selected nations. 
Their approach is based on the idea that education might have additional positive 
external effects (nonmarket benefits) due to nonmarket interactions (via ‘social 
multipliers’; see Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2000; Glaeser et al. 2003). The novelty of 
the Entorf and Lauk paper is that by taking migrant-to-migrant, native-to-migrant and 
native-to-native peer relations into account, the authors are able to test and confirm 
the hypothesis that early tracking reinforces and even amplifies existing 
socioeconomic pre-school disadvantages of children with a migration background, 
because (high) social interaction mainly takes place within the group of migrants and 
within the group of natives (with detrimental educational effects to migrants), but less 
so between both groups. In this paper we estimate the model using data on PISA 
maths scores and analyse differences between social interaction parameters obtained 
for German and UK students. 
A serious limitation for the aforementioned technique is the lack of PISA panel data 
such that evidence on the role of institutional structures can be gained only by 
international comparison. Overcoming the limitations of the PISA data in the Entorf-
Lauk model can be achieved with a strategy inspired by the first of the two 
identification strategies, as these are described in the Hoxby paper (2000), where the 
notion of first differences in cohorts is used. The basic advantage of this approach is 
twofold. First, deviating from most previous empirical investigations which analyse 
potential reasons for the educational gap between migrants and natives in separate 
equations, we focus on aggregate observational units at school level such that for each 
school we can directly estimate endogenous differences in educational achievements 
dependent on explanatory differences of explanatory student factors and school 
characteristics. This leads to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the native-migrant 
PISA gap. The second point is that taking differences between migrants and natives at 
the school level mitigates the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, as unobserved 
school factors  s δ common to all students i(s) at school s are differenced out, and 
heterogeneity due to unobserved true individual abilities (such as intelligence) is 
expected to be similar for migrants and natives when group averages are considered.  
Our results show that the socioeconomic background of parents and cultural capital at 
home are the most important factors for educational success in both countries. Using 
the equivalent Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, it also turns out that the educational 
gap between natives and migrants is mainly due to the ‘endowment effect’ provided 
by these factors. ‘Discriminatory effects’ cannot be detected. Some adverse 
‘integration effects’ do exist for female migrants in Germany who lose ground on 
other groups. Estimated ‘social multipliers’ are higher for the German early tracking 
schooling system than for comprehensive schools in the UK. This result is detrimental 
for most migrant students at least in Germany, because multiplier effects magnify the   5
prevailing educational inequality between students who enter schools with a low 
parental socioeconomic background and children from more privileged families. 
This paper is organised as follows. In the second section we discuss methodological 
issues; we focus on the identification of endogenous social effects, the so - called 
reflection problem and we connect this to the propagation of the spillover effects, 
embodied in what is known as the social multiplier in the relevant literature. We 
extend this section first by discussing the baseline model as an identification strategy 
that will allow the detection of the presence (if any) and the quantification of peer 
effects in a setting appropriate to inquire into educational inequality, and, second, by 
estimating a model allowing the presence of unobserved heterogeneity components, 
eliminated by taking differences between the groups of natives and migrants. The last 
section concludes and summarises the results. 
 
2. Social Multipliers as Potential Source of Educational Inequality 
 
2.1. Identification of Endogenous Social Effects - The Reflection Problem 
An example of the difficulty of identifying parameters of interest in the presence of 
endogenous variables is that of the reflection problem in the social sciences (Manski, 
1993, 1995, 2000). Social interaction has already been studied both theoretically and 
empirically to the extent that a well-defined framework is established in the field of 
economics; it has already been treated in a theoretical framework (as in Becker, 1974) 
to comprehend the channel through which the behaviour of a person is affected by the 
characteristics of his/ her family members. It can be deemed as a form of externality 
(c.f. Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2000), bearing the sense of interactions occurring 
between individuals in the absence of prices. Empirical analysis of social interaction 
and behaviour is hindered by the fact that it resembles the situation in which a person 
sits in front of a mirror and can see his/her reflection but, nevertheless, it cannot be 
distinguished whether, at the same time, the moves the person makes are caused by 
his/her own reflection or are merely reflected. Simultaneously, a second impediment 
is selection, for individuals tend to choose their peers, neighbourhoods or networks. 
Thus, unlike identification of parameters in market outcomes
4, behaviour in non-
market settings and environments is still under the scope of broad analysis and 
develops constantly. Key questions to be answered refer to the influence that the 
group behaviour might exert on individuals’ behaviour of the same group and the 
tendency of the group’s individuals to behave in a similar manner, whereas 
applications refer initially to the fields of econometrics of crime, economics of 
education or labour economics. The incipient step towards identification would be to 
obtain prior information that specifies the group and reveals its characteristics. If this 
                                                 
4 Renown examples cited when market outcomes are concerned is the two-equation demand-supply 
system and the Mincerian to estimate returns to schooling.    6
information could be extracted, then identification depends upon underlying 
relationships between variables in the population.  
Although Manski (1993) discusses identification of endogenous social effects in a 
number of models (linear models, nonlinear/ nonparametric models as well as 
dynamic models), special attention is drawn here to linear parametric models, a choice 
justified by the employment of a linear (in means) parametric model in order to 
illustrate the estimation of social interaction parameters in education, where the 
outcome is the achievement of students.  
Following Manski (1993) in our attempt to delve identification strategy issues, we 
usually assume - at first - that a random sample (,,) yxz is available from the 
population.  y  would represent the scalar outcome or behaviour, x all variables which 
capture the same institutional environments and/ or group characteristics and, finally, 
(,) zu summarise direct socioeconomic composition and ability. The scalar outcome 
y  is specified in the following way:  
(1)       (|) (|) ' '     =+ + + + yE y x E z x z u α βγ η     
meaning that, econometrically, the outcome is modelled so that it varies with the 
mean of the outcome conditional on all variables that represent similar institutional 
environments.  Note, though, that conditional on both x and z  the mean of the error 
term is different from zero:  (|,) ' = Eu xz xδ  (absence of zero conditional mean 
assumption).  
Taking the conditional expectation with respect to both x and z  by using the law of 
iterated expectations, we obtain the mean regression of  y  on (,) x z :  
(2)     (|,) (|) (|) ' ' ' = +++ + Eyxz Eyx Ezx z x α βγ η δ . 
Each of the parameters  , β γ  and δ  represents an endogenous, an exogenous and a 
correlated effect respectively. The presence of the expected value of  y  conditional on 
x at the right - hand side reveals the explanatory role of endogenous social effects on 
individual outcomes provided  0 β ≠ . This follows from the presumption that the 
outcome varies with the mean of the outcomes of the peers and is exactly the source 
of the reflection problem. Parameter  0 γ ≠  depicts the exogenous effect, for variable 
z  includes the exogenous variables. Likewise, parameter  0 δ ≠  expresses the 
correlated effect, capturing similarity in behaviour among peers (presence of group 
effects). Furthermore, by assuming that the mean regressions of  y  on (,) x z , of  y  on 
x and of z  on  x can be consistently estimated, one can use the last equation and 
integrate it with respect to z , assume  1 β ≠  and solve for  ( | ) Eyx, in order to obtain 
the ‘social equilibrium’: 
(3)  
1
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As seen above, it is possible to identify functions of the parameters of interest if 1 β ≠ , 
but not the parameters themselves and, of course, one cannot distinguish among 
endogenous, exogenous and correlated effects. Substituting  ( | ) Eyx from (3) into (2), 
yields the reduced form equation: 
(4)  
1










Although we are not able to discern between endogenous and exogenous social 
effects, we are allowed to detect the presence - if any - of a social effect provided 
[1, ( | ), , ] Ezx xz are linearly independent in the population. Presence of a social effect 
means that  0 γ βη +≠  for the numerator. Thus, either   0 γ ≠  or  0 βη ≠  must be true. 
Unfortunately, we are also not able to disentangle the effect of social interactions 
from effects due to unobserved group characteristics. 
There are two cases in which identification is achieved using some exclusion criteria. 
First, by assuming exclusive presence of endogenous effects, which amounts to 
imposing  0 γ δ == on the parameter vector. This pure endogenous model can be 
estimated in a two–stage procedure; by using sample data one can retrieve a 
nonparametric estimate of the mean outcome given x, and use this estimate later on 
to identify the social interactions parameter β  with least squares. The second case is 
described by Graham and Hahn (2005), where one assumes absence of exogenous 
social effects, i.e.  0 γ =  . Using a quasi-panel approach, estimating the between 
groups model identifies η , and upon the availability of an instrumental variable, 
2SLS provide an estimate for the composite parameter  /(1 ) − η β ; thus, the magnitude 
of the (endogenous) social effect can be inferred in a completely parametric 
procedure.   
 
2.2. The Social Multiplier  
Social interaction will have a multiplicative effect as in the sense of the Keynesian 
multiplier in the macro economy, due to the presence of endogenous social effects 
(and not of exogenous or correlated effects).  Hence, one would also be interested in 
identifying those resulting social multipliers i.e. quantify spillover effects
5 caused by 
peers. The social multiplier embraces both direct and indirect effects on the 
individual’s behaviour, the direct one emanating from the change in the individual’s 
behaviour, whereas the indirect effect stemming from the change in the behaviour of 
the peer group. Thus, the presence of a social multiplier should render at least 
problematic the employment of aggregate - level data when aiming at inferring 
individual - level elasticities.  
                                                 
5 They are also characterised as positive spillovers or strategic complementarities in Glaeser et al. 
(2000, 2003).   8
Glaeser et al. (2000, 2003) have set up theoretical models of non-market interactions 
and connect the presence of a strong social multiplier with the presence of multiple 
equilibria. In practice, the empirical method extensively used to measure social 
interaction parameters and, subsequently, calculate social multipliers, is modelling in 
an econometric equation the individual outcome as the dependent variable and the 
average outcome of the relevant peer group as part of the explanatory variables. Of 
course, the average outcome does not include the individual itself
6. Examples of the 
existence of the social multiplier in applied work include the impact of education on 
wages (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001), the impact of demographics on crime (Levitt, 
1999), group membership among college roommates (Sacerdote, 2001) and peer 
effects within migrants and natives and between migrants and natives in schooling 
(Entorf and Lauk, 2008). 
Intuitively, the social multiplier would not constitute anything else but the ratio of a 
coefficient coming from a regression using aggregate data - for instance country level 
data -  and one from a regression using individual level data (given that coefficients 
are identified). In the simplest case, if a regression yields a coefficient γ  on the social 
interaction variable, then the magnitude of the social multiplier would equal 1( 1 ) γ − . 
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) have provided the framework for the 
simple case, but also developed it further in order to accommodate (i) sorting across 
neighbourhoods, (ii) individuals’ characteristics and actions affecting the individual 
outcome, and, eventually, (iii) different degrees of  peer influence according to the 
distance of the peer. 
 
2.3 The Baseline Model as Identification Strategy  
Emphasis is placed herein upon the choice of the strategy that will allow identification 
of the social interaction parameters and illustration of the strategy’s applicability 
when the researcher is provided with appropriate data. One empirical strategy used 
extensively in practice to identify peer effects is that of the baseline model. As in 
Hoxby (2000), the baseline model is usually formulated by the following equation:  
(5)     
i
ij j ij yb y X c α
− =+ +    




−  is the average of the outcome for all individuals in group j  excluding 
individual i, and  ij X is a vector of all other characteristics and factors that one might 
expect to affect individual  's i  outcome. In the schooling environment chosen in this 
paper,  ij y  would represent student  's i  achievement score in mathematics, 
i
j y
−  would 
                                                 
6 This will become obvious from the baseline model in section 2.3.   9
stand for the mean student score in mathematics achieved by student  's i  peer group
7, 
and ij X encompasses all other student-specific explanatory variables.  
Entorf and Lauk (2008) provide a comprehensive empirical analysis and interpretation 
of the educational inequality between migrants and natives.  Using their notation, one 
can identify peer effects in education between and within migrants and natives by 
modelling a two-equation system as follows:  





mm m m m m n m
is f is s m s f n s f is f
nn n n m n n n
is f is s m s f n s f is f
PX R P P
PX R P P
β δγγε
βδ γ γ ε
=+ + + +
=+ + + +




is f P  is the PISA score for migrant student i in school s for field 
{, , } f mathematics reading science ∈ , 
s
n
is f P  as before but for native student i in school 
s in field  f , 
m
sf P and 
n
sf P  are the respective averages of PISA mathematics (reading 
or science) scores of migrant and native peer groups at the school - level,  s R  includes 
all school-specific resources at school s, and 
s is X all student specific-variables.  
This is merely an extension of the baseline model which facilitates to address 
questions regarding, on the one hand, cross-sectional comparisons of the different 
schooling systems among the countries included in the PISA dataset, and, on the other 
hand, potential educational inequalities arising between students with and without a 
migration background. As made obvious from the system of equations (6), peer 
effects will be estimated at the school level. The authors select four groups of 
countries, namely: a) traditional countries of immigration: Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, b) countries of “labour migration” and non-comprehensive school systems: 
Austria, Germany, c) countries of “labour migration” and comprehensive school 
systems: Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and d) countries of Central and Eastern Europe: 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia. The groups are chosen as such in order to 
capture specific educational/ institutional and immigration conditions that prevail in 
each of the groups of countries. This is of great importance once one wishes to 
explore differences in educational performance, which in turn helps to test the 
hypothesis that early tracking reinforces segregation effects. Estimation of system (6) 
quantifies the effect of the migrants’ social integration and the role of non-
comprehensive schooling systems on their achievement, both closely related to the 
presence and extent of educational inequality. The merit of this approach is being 
evinced by the results, which make reference to all possible combinations and 
directions of peer effects, i.e. migrant-to-migrant, migrant-to-native, native-to-native 
and native-to-migrant.  The implications on each country’s followed immigration 
policy can be immense.  
                                                 
7 What exactly is defined as peer group and who exactly is included is very important for the analysis, 
both in terms of econometric estimation and interpretation of the resulting coefficients.    10
Still interest lies on the impact of the schooling systems and tracking at the age of 10 
on the social integration of children with a poor socioeconomic or immigration 
background.  
The question that arises immediately after the presentation of the estimable baseline 
equations is the connection to Manski’s effects, as those were described in section 2. 
Most importantly, the equation in system (6) models the endogenous effects, which 
yield the parameters of social interaction, namely
m
m γ , 
m
n γ , 
n
m γ  and 
n
n γ . As in Manski’s 
equation (1), the average achievement score of the peers has to be included as an 
explanatory variable. Were we to exclude it, we would be confronted with an omitted 
variable bias in our estimations. At the same time, including this average will induce a 
simultaneity bias problem, for student  ' is  relevant mathematics achievement score 
will be present both at right - hand (dependent variable) and left - hand (independent 
variable) sides of any of the two equations of system (6), but, moreover,  for student i 
constitutes him/ herself a peer for the rest of the members of the peer group, hence it 
may be the case he/ she partially determines the achievement score of the peer group 
under discussion. Thereby, the link to the reflection problem has become clearer. The 
problem is alleviated by disregarding the contribution of student i, when calculating 
these averages.  
In a similar way, system (6) comprehends the exogenous individual effects, meaning 
all explanatory variables that are student-specific, for instance the student’s gender, 
type of family structure, parents’ educational level etc. The third of Manski’s effects, 
i.e. the correlated effect is present through the correlated environmental effects, 
meaning school-specific explanatory variables that are commonly faced by the 
students, i.e. living in the same small village or town, sharing the same quality of a 
school’s educational resources etc. 
Another common source of possible perturbation linked to the econometric modelling 
of peer effects is that of selection
8, that will eventually result in the presence of some 
sorting bias.  In this context, self-selection arises from the fact that individuals tend to 
choose the group and the members of the groups in which they belong to, i.e. students 
may choose their peers. Furthermore, selection emerges because some parents tend to 
choose/ control the school their child will attend or because some schools’ decisions 
on accepting a certain student is based on the student’s previous performance, 
residence or parents’ characteristics and status. This bias diminishes by the inclusion 
of an appropriate school-specific set of variables, while the verification of the 
reduction of the bias can be controlled with performing a set of robustness checks 
regressions.   
The last point that seeks attention is the issue of identifying the social multipliers. An 
exogenous change that influences the mathematics achievement of one student, will in 
                                                 
8 Depending on the question of interest, the problem of selection can be addressed by the employment 
of sample selection models.   11
turn affect the achievement of another adjacent student; this can initiate a chain of 
interactions among the students, which as a spillover effect will tend to multiply and 
magnify the original dimension of the impact. Entorf and Lauk (2008) tackle this by 
aggregating individual results within groups and within schools, which after solving a 
two-equation system for the average achievement scores for both migrant and native 

































     
where 
m M is the resulting multiplier for migrants and 
n M the multiplier for natives. A 
point to notice is the connection with the social multiplier studied by Glaeser et al. 
(2000, 2003), as mentioned in section 2.2., where the simple case emerges from the 
estimable version of (5), i.e. 
s ss
i
is s is is yb y X c α ε
− =+ + +  when we disregard existence 
of any impact from one group to another. Consecutively, calculation of social 
multipliers can reveal the impact of social interaction in an environment as simple as 
described by equation (5) or even in a more intricate framework as the one presented 
by system (6), which allows disentangling peer effects between and within students 
with and without a migration background. 
 
3. Data, Descriptive Evidence and Estimation of Social Multipliers 
The data used to empirically estimate the baseline model of peer effects and the model 
of unobserved heterogeneity are taken from the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), conducted every three years by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD  2000, 2003, 2006) to assess the performance 
of 15-year olds in reading, mathematics, science and problem solving. In this study 
we utilise all three waves, i.e. the PISA 2000, 2003 and 2006 reports and use students’ 
scores on mathematical ability to see the evolving of statistics of interest. For 
estimation purposes, we use the 2006 Report and scores in mathematics. According to 
the PISA study, assessment on mathematics aims at evaluating “The capacity to 
identify and understand the role that mathematics plays in the world, to make well-
founded judgements and to use and engage with mathematics in ways that meet the 
needs of that individual’s life as a constructive, concerned and reflective citizen. 
Related to wider, functional use of mathematics, engagement requires the ability to 
recognise and formulate mathematical problems in various situations
9”. The sampling 
design used for the construction of the PISA dataset is a two-way stratified 
                                                 
9 Programme for International Student Assessment, “Learning for Tomorrow’s World, First Results 
from PISA 2003”, OECD 2004.   12
sampling
10; the first stage treats schools within each country as the sampling unit, i.e. 
schools having 15-year old students are sampled with probabilities proportional to a 
measure of size. The minimum number of schools was 150 or all if there were fewer 
of 150. In the second stage, the sampling unit consists of 15-year old students within 
the first stage sampled schools. At most 35 students (target cluster size) were selected; 
the minimum required number was 20 so as to ensure accuracy.   
Obviously, the sample design is that of a clustered sample; hence, we might find it 
difficult to accept that students belonging to the same school are truly independent, 
since some characteristics may be common but, nevertheless, not captured by the 
variables already included in the PISA dataset; it seems reasonable to be prepared to 
accept correlation among students within the same school, especially of those that 
may belong in the same classroom (the PISA dataset does not include a class 
identifier - only a school identifier - thus, we are provided with no information on this 
matter), but not any among the schools of each country, i.e. presence of within school 
correlation, but not of between school correlation. Adjustment to calculate robust 
standards errors is explicitly rendered necessary before proceeding into making any 
valid statistical inference.  
Another issue emerging with the use of stratified and clustered data, as already 
mentioned, is the probability proportional to size sampling for schools within a 
country, the assignment of schools in strata and the sampling of students within 
schools (some students had to be excluded). This means that sampling weights, 
provided already in the dataset, must be employed in order to obtain representative 
coefficients or results. General treatment of stratified and clustered data has already 
been studied by DuMouchel and Duncan (1983), who point out the necessity of 
carrying out Weighted Least Squares regressions to ensure that representative students 
and schools are used in the analysis; Moulton (1986) underlines the inappropriateness 
of Ordinary Least Squares when errors are potentially correlated within groups (or 
clusters). Deaton (1996) provides the framework for regressions in the case of 
clustered samples. In practice, Wössmann (2003) applies some of the aforementioned 
techniques in the estimation of within-country cross-sectional education production 
functions using the TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and Science Study) 
dataset. Lastly, Wooldridge (2006) extensively analyses the econometric methods that 
should be applied when the researcher is faced with cluster-samples. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on selected variables for Germany and the UK. 
The share of migrants (defined as students both of whose parents were born abroad) 
ranges between 14% to 16% in Germany, and between 8% to 9% in UK. The share of 
female participants is about 50% for both countries. OECD PISA scores are 
standardised such that the OECD mean is 500. Table 1 reveals that migrants clearly 
fall behind in Germany, where the educational gap amounts to 73 to 83 PISA points.  
                                                 
10 In some countries, a three-stage sampling design was used, where the first stage now entails 
sampling geographical areas with probability, again, proportional to size sampling.   13
As already stated above for the PISA 2000 (reading) score (Entorf and Minoiu, 2005; 
Schnepf, 2007), the maths score of migrants is also below that of natives in the UK, 
but to a lesser extent (between 15 and 40 points). Given the high intergenerational 
correlation of education found for both countries (see Entorf and Minoiu, 2005), it is 
perhaps not surprising that differences between migrant and native students are more 
pronounced for Germany than for the UK: Whereas the parental socioeconomic 
background of migrants and natives measured by ISEI (i.e. the International 
Socioeconomic Index of Occupational Status) strongly differs in Germany, there is 
practically the same background for both student groups in the UK (in both countries 
the average ISEI is about 45 for native parents).  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Selected Variables, PISA Mathematics Scores   
 (2000, 2003, 2006) 
Country                                                   
Year  Germany UK 








































































    *Observations are weighted by student weights. Authors’ own calculations. 
 
Segregation and high clustering of migrants in neighbourhoods might have a negative 
impact on immigrants’ educational achievement since there is less social interaction   14
with natives than in mixed environments. Pupils are likely to be influenced by their 
peers’ school ambitions and these are likely to be different in highly segregated 
schools. An indicator of (positive or negative) segregation is the allocation of migrant 
students to top or bottom ranked schools, as measured by average PISA scores. Table 
1 reveals that there seems to be some symmetry for presence of migrants in top and 
bottom ranked schools in the UK (note, however, that figures in the UK fluctuate due 
to a rather small number of migrant students, see in particular the high outlying share 
of migrants in bottom ranked schools in 2000), while some stark contrasts do exist for 
Germany. Contrary to the situation in Germany, more than 10% of migrants reach top 
levels (implying overrepresentation of migrants in top schools; equal performance and 
opportunities of migrants and natives would imply that 10% of each group would 
reach the 10% top levels). In Germany, only about 5% are likewise successful, while 
about 15% are allocated to the bottom 10% schools. This discrepancy is presumably 
based on the disadvantaged socioeconomic status of migrant families and reinforced 
by the German schooling system based on early tracking by skill level which selects 
the majority of migrants into the lowest ranked secondary school, i.e. the 
Hauptschule. 
The last column of Table 1 shows the decomposition of the PISA score variance into 
its between-school and within-school shares. Results reveal differences which most 
likely are caused by characteristics of comprehensive versus ability-tracking 
schooling systems. The high ratio of between school variance in Germany is mainly 
driven by the heterogeneity of abilities across different types of schools (Gymnasium, 
Realschule, Gymnasium), whereas students in the UK are allocated to different tracks 
within a comprehensive school system (with only few exceptions).  
Summing up, Germany and the UK mainly differ with respect to the socioeconomic 
status of migrants’ (typically Western immigrants in the UK, Turks and Eastern 
Europeans in Germany) which has also led to strong segregation of migrants in 
bottom ranked schools in Germany. This contrast between the two countries seems to 
be reinforced by the early separation into different schools compared to the general 
attendance of comprehensive schools in the UK. 
Below (Table 2) we provide estimation results for equation (6) for Germany and the 
UK, and calculation of the social multipliers (Table 3). The detailed description of 
explanatory variables can be found in the Appendix. Note that we define ‘migrants’ as 
students both of whose parents were born abroad. The specification resembles the one 
by Entorf and Lauk (2008) on PISA reading scores and is based on standard 
individual and school factors already employed by Wößmann (2003), Jürges und 
Schneider (2004), Ammermüller (2005) and others. The novelty of our approach lies 
in its separate modelling of migrant and native achievements and in considering peer 
effects arising from the influence of both migrant and native mean achievements.    15
Looking at the equation for natives from both countries first, estimated coefficients 
are largely as expected from previous research on student PISA achievements. As has 
been found in the literature, school specific factors turn out to be insignificant when 
individual factors are controlled for (except ‘selection by performance’ for schools in 
the UK).  
Table 2: Estimation of Baseline Model for Pisa Maths Scores 2006, Germany and 
the UK 
Dependent Variable:  
Mathematics Score  Germany United  Kingdom  (UK) 





-29.529       
(5.288)           
[0.000] 
-14.776    
(2.302)       
[0.000]     
-13.063    
(8.606)       
[0.133] 




-76.082       
(8.420)          
[0.000] 
_ _ 
Grade 9, Germany 
-36.403        
(2.475)           
[0.000] 
-39.755       
(7.664)           
[0.000] 
           _  _ 
Grade 11, UK  _ _ 
10.644     
(8.042)        
[0.187]     
2.228     
(32.047)       
[0.945] 
Foreign Born 
-1.024        
(14.415)         
[0.943] 
15.537         
(5.152)          
[0.003] 
10.103      
(7.787)        
[0.196]     
5.453       
(9.181)       
[0.554] 
National Language at Home 
24.839          
(7.008) 
[0.001] 
18.251         
(5.927)           
[0.003] 
-16.205   
(11.276)       
[0.153]      
4.144       
(8.818)        
[0.640] 
More than 100 Books at Home 
24.839         
(2.677)           
[0.000] 
6.636           
(5.818)           
[0.257] 
  29.364   
(2.998)        
[0.000]      
30.807     
(8.473)        
[0.000] 
Home Educational Resources 
3.063 
(1.415)           
[0.032] 
-1.108         
(2.937)           
[0.707] 
11.472     
(1.714)       
[0.000]      
15.006      
(6.565)       
[0.025] 





9.406           
(3.285)           
[0.005] 
13.557     
(1.945)       
[0.000]       
16.551      
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Table 2: (continued) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Mathematics Score  Germany United  Kingdom  (UK) 
 Natives  Migrants  Natives  Migrants 




0.630           
(0.704)           
[0.373] 
-0.005      
(0.401)       
[0.989]     
2.716       
(2.013)       
[0.181] 
Quality of School’s Educational 
Resources 
-0.389         
(0.898)           
[0.666] 
4.694           
(2.992)           
[0.120] 
0.439       
(0.835)        
[0.599]     
3.172       
(3.657)       
[0.388] 
Village / Small Town 
-0.647         
(2.246)           
[0.774] 
0.533           
(6.130)           
[0.931] 
-0.852      
(1.941)       
[0.661]     
-3.919    
(10.439)       
[0.708] 
Selection by Residence 
-3.627 
(2.515)           
[0.151] 
-3.233         
(6.493)           
[0.620] 
-0.244      
(1.855)       
[0.895]     
0.512     
(10.278)      
[0.960] 
Selection by Performance 
-1.195          
(2.240)           
[0.594] 
-4.244         
(5.994)           
[0.480] 
18.318     
(4.143)       
[0.000]      
12.619   
(16.324)        
[0.442] 
Responsibility for Curriculum 
and Assessment 
-1.568         
(1.352)           
[0.248] 
6.981           
(4.296)           
[0.107] 
1.454       
(1.252)       
[0.247]     
-4.925      
(7.616)        
[0.519] 
Responsibility for Resource 
Allocation 
1.772           
(2.560)           
[0.490] 
7.059            
(6.676)           
[0.293] 
-1.072      
(0.952)        
[0.262]     
5.198       
(5.932)       
[0.383] 
Public School 
0.645           
(6.364)           
[0.919] 
20.268        
(18.400)          
[0.273] 
5.974       
(4.125)        
[0.149]     
-30.982   
(20.220)      
[0.129] 




0.715           
(0.074)           
[0.000] 
0.577        
(0.039)       
[0.000]      
0.328       
(0.139)       
[0.021] 
Mean of Maths Scores, Migrants 
0.103 
(0.031)        
[0.001] 
0.030         
(0.079)           
[0.700] 
0.057       
(0.013)       
[0.000]      
0.197       
(0.103)        
[0.059] 
R - Squared  0.633 0.653  0.376  0.449 
Observations  2332 410  3850  379 
*Estimation Method: OLS. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and p - values in brackets.  
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Among the most significant factors, our results confirm the important role of the 
parental cultural and socioeconomic background. In both countries, ‘more than 100 
books at home’ and ‘home educational resources’ contribute to the variance of PISA 
in a highly significant way. The ‘economic, social and cultural status’ (which replaced 
ISEI from previous studies) seems to be covered by ‘books at home’ in Germany, 
while it is significant for the UK. In both countries male students have higher scores 
than their female compatriots. This result reverses the outcome based on the ‘reading’ 
PISA scores which showed superior performance of females (see, e.g., Entorf and 
Lauk, 2008).     
Estimation results for migrants in Germany deviate from those of migrants in the UK 
in several respects. The reason might be seen in the fact that the ‘median migrant’ 
originates from Turkey in Germany, while he is from a Western industrialised country 
in the UK.
11 Leaving aside strong effects arising from the fact that the test was 
performed by pupils attending classes lower than 10
th grade, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the language of the host country spoken at home (i.e. migrant parents 
speak German to migrant children) turns out being one of the most important factors 
of educational success for migrants in Germany, while this variable has no significant 
impact in the UK. As the English language poses no serious problem for the large 
majority of immigrants to the UK (contrary to the German language for migrants in 
Germany), it is confirmed not being an obstacle for solving mathematical problems.
12  
The high and significant effect for ‘foreign born’ (indicates whether the migrant is 
born in the country or not) reflects further problems of integration conditional on the 
long list of factors already included.  It is high and significant in Germany (but not in 
the UK) which confirms the different nature of immigration in both countries. As 
regards the background of parents, ‘more than 100 books at home’ is nicely suited for 
discriminating between advantaged students endowed with cultural capital from well 
educated homes and less advantaged students from labour migrant families in the UK, 
as having ‘more than 100 books at home’ or not has the effect of more than 30 PISA 
points. This variable is less relevant in Germany. Here, but also in the UK, the 
parental background is significantly covered by the ‘economic, social and cultural 
status’.  
The somewhat surprising insignificance of ‘books at home’ and ‘home educational 
resources’ in the migrant equation for Germany might be the result of dominant and 
highly significant peer effects, as part of the exogenous influence is now covered 
                                                 
11 According to SOPEMI 2002 (OECD 2003), 2.59 million (which equals 4.3 percent of the British 
population) non-nationals were living in Great Britain of which the biggest group (436 thousand) is 
Irish, followed by migrants from the US (148 thousand), India (132 thousand), Italy  (102 thousand), 
France and Pakistan (both 82 thousand). 
12 Note that ’language spoken at home’ is also a significant factor for natives from Germany. 
According to the definition of migrants, ‘natives’ also include children from at least one or two second-
generation immigrants born in the country. Thus, the positive sign reveals persistent integration 
problems of second-generation (or even third-generation) immigrants in Germany.   18
through the channel of endogenous effects. Irrespective of whether we consider the 
equations for migrants or natives, the influence of the native peer group achievement 
is always higher than the influence of the migrant peer group, and the impact of native 
peers is higher in Germany than in the UK. The reverse impact, i.e. from migrants to 
migrants or from migrants to natives is much smaller in both countries, and remains 
insignificant for the German migrant equation. The migrant-to-migrant propagation is 
more pronounced in the UK (estimated coefficient = 0.20), but only weakly 
significant (p-value = 0.059) which is also affected by the rather small number of 
observations (379).   
How do estimates from Table 2 translate into social multipliers? In Table 3, we 
provide numerical values of social multipliers presented in (7). Standard errors are 
calculated using the delta method. In both countries the size of the multiplier effect on 
natives is higher than the impact on migrants, with the multiplier of the German 
schooling system (3.9) clearly exceeding the UK one (2.5). Both coefficients are 
significantly above unity, i.e. the benchmark case without any social interaction. This 
also holds for migrants in Germany (1.34) but not for migrants in the UK (1.32), 
where standard errors are somewhat higher. 
Table 3: Calculation of Social Multipliers 
Social Multiplier Effects   
m M  
(Migrants) 
n M  
(Natives) 








            * Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
These estimates are in line with results presented in Entorf and Lauk (2008). 
Multiplier effects magnify the prevailing educational inequality between students with 
a low parental socioeconomic migration background and children from more 
privileged families. This conclusion holds for all equations, i.e. for both native and 
migrant students. It is also confirmed that such multipliers seem to be higher in ability 
differentiated school systems (like Germany) than in comprehensive schools (like the 
UK). However, when compared to Scandinavian countries, multipliers in the UK are 
still high: multipliers based on ‘reading’ have only been 1.7 for natives and 1.1 for 




                                                 
13 Likewise in the ‘reading’ context, the respective multipliers have been 4.0 and 1.45 (i.e. very close to 
results presented in this study) for students from the aggregate group ‘Austria and Germany’.   19
4. Explaining Inequality, Consideration of Unobserved Heterogeneity 
A serious limitation of employed PISA data sets is their cross-sectional structure. As 
is well known in applied econometric work, unobserved heterogeneity might affect 
consistency of parameter estimates and cause some omitted variable bias. Hoxby 
(2000) suggests using first differences from cohorts in order to get rid of cohort-
specific and cohort-invariant unobserved factors. This procedure is not feasible due to 
the nature of PISA data which collects data from 15-year old teenagers with only few 
observations based on different years of birth. We proceed in an alternative way 
which should eliminate a large fraction of student and school specific unobserved 
heterogeneity (unfortunately, class specific effects cannot be observed due to the 
absence of class identifiers). At the same time, by taking the distance between 
natives’ and migrants’ educational achievements, we are going to analyse and 
evaluate inequality increasing and dampening factors. 
We start by considering student i at schools s whose academic achievement is being 
affected by individual and school specific factors introduced in the previous section. 
According to our notion of inequality, we distinguish between migrant and native 
students. In addition, we account for unobserved heterogeneity at student and school 
level, leading to the following equations:  
 
(8)       () () () ()
mm m m m m
is is is s is PX β γδ ε =+ + +  
(9)       () () () ()
nn n n n n




is P :   PISA score in mathematics of student i in schools, , j mn =  
  ()
j
is X :  vector of student specific characteristics, both student and school    
  varying,  , j mn =  
  ()
j
is γ :   unobserved student characteristics,  , j mn =  
 
j
s δ : unobserved  school  characteristics,  , j mn = . 
Taking the average over all students in school s yields 
(10)     = +++
j jj j j j
s ss s s PX β γδε , , j mn = . 
There is no reason to believe that intelligence (or true mean achievement or ability) is 
on average different between the group of native and the group of migrant students. 
Moreover, migrants and natives allocated to the same school have identical school   20
neighbourhoods and share common resources such that it is sensible to assume that 
=
mn
s s δ δ .
14  
Taking the difference between natives and migrants equations yields: 
(11)      () ( ) −= − + −
nm n n m m n m
s ss s s s PP X X β βε ε . 
Equation (11) identifies the list of factors having a significant impact on the native-
migrants gap, but it does not properly account for underlying reasons of inequality. 
Adapting the idea of the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition of the gender wage 
gap to the educational gap
15, background factors can be seen in different endowments 




s X , i.e. different socioeconomic backgrounds etc.), but 
also in different parameters 
n β  and 
m β . This ‘coefficient effect’ or ‘return effect’, 
which is often interpreted as ‘discrimination’ in the gender wage differential (unequal 
pay despite identical qualification), and the ‘endowment effect’ (i.e.( )
nm
s s X X − ) can 
be identified from the following transformation of equation (11):
16 
(12)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
nm n m n m nm n m
s ss s s s s PP XX X β ββ εε −=− + −+ − 
In the context of PISA gaps, a negative ‘return effect’ ( )
nm β β −  indicates that a 
given exogenous endowment of migrants (
m
s X ) would yield higher returns to natives 
than to migrants. This could be due to insufficient integration hindering success in 
school, interaction problems between teachers and pupils, different attitudes or efforts 
between migrants and natives, but also due to mere discrimination. 
Equations (11) and (12) are estimated using ordinary least squares; results are 
presented in Tables 4 to 7.  The histogram of the left hand side variable is depicted for 
both countries in Figures 1 and 2. As expected from reported individual differences 
between natives and migrants in Table 2, the mean (28) is positive, but it is well 
below 73 (the distance detected in Table 2) in Germany, because students are 
segregated by skill level such that this difference of 28 reflects inequality within 
schools, not between-schools. This does not hold for the comprehensive school 
system in the UK. Here the mean is 8, i.e. not that far from the figure in Table 2 (i.e. 
25). The higher homogeneity of German schools can also be seen by the higher 
standard deviation of distances within school in the UK (68) compared to (46) in 
Germany.  
                                                 
14 Of course, this assumption excludes racial discrimination such as unequal treatment of natives and 
migrants by teachers in common. 
15 Ammermüller (2005, 2007) applied a similar approach to individual PISA data. 
16 As well known from the original Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) papers, the transformation to 
equation (12) is not unique. Hence, the alternative model () ( ) () ( ) nm nm m n nm nm PP XX X s ss s s s s ββ β ε ε −=− + −+ − 
could likewise be estimated. However, the only additional parameter  m β  is already covered by 
estimating equation (11). Notwithstanding, the alternative specification is presented in the Appendix.    21
For the UK, the availability of home educational resources plays a crucial role. This, 
too, is related to parental background and confirms that absence of resources such as a 
quiet place to study, a desk for study, a dictionary and calculators at home might 
further increase educational inequality. It is remarkable that statistical significance is 
mainly limited to migrant factors. Thus, it is mainly the improvement of the migrants’ 
situation rather than the deterioration of the natives’ situation that would diminish the 
gap between natives and migrants in the UK. 
Figure 1: Differences in Schools’ PISA Scores, Germany 




















mean(28) -1 s.d.(46) +1 s.d.(46) -2 s.d. +2 s.d. -3 s.d. +3 s.d.
-100 -50 0 50 100 150
Difference in Math Scores
Source: PISA 2006
Difference of Natives and Migrants in PISA Math Scores, Germany
 
 
Figure 2: Differences in Schools’ PISA Scores, UK 

























mean(8) -1 s.d.(68) +1 s.d.(68) -2 s.d. +2 s.d. -3 s.d. +3 s.d.
-200 -100 0 100 200
Difference in Math Scores
Source: PISA 2006
Difference of Natives and Migrants in PISA Math Scores, UK
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Equation (11), Germany 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Maths Scores Between Natives and Migrants 
( model specification: () − =− + nm n n m m





n β  
m β  
n β  
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[0.693]         
2.821    
 (12.795) 
[0.826] 
R - Squared  0.195 0.159 
Observations  177 177 




Table 5: Estimation Results for Equation (11), UK 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Maths Scores Between Natives and Migrants 
( model specification: () − =− + nm n n m m
s ss s s PP X X β βε  ) 




n β  
m β  
n β  













































Share of More 


















   23
Table 5 (continued) 
 
n β  
m β  
n β  
m β  
Share of 
Language 











[0.721]     
5.242 
(12.021) 
[0.663]     
R - Squared  0.152 0.140 
Observations  202 202 
*Estimation Method: OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p - values in 
brackets. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 decompose the PISA gap between natives and migrants into two parts, 
‘endowment’ and ‘integration/discrimination’ (‘coefficient effect’). In the two 
countries under investigation, this viewpoint confirms that differences in student 
achievements mainly arise due to less advantaged endowments for migrants. In 
particular, the socioeconomic status of parents (UK) and the cultural capital 
endowment at home (‘books at home’, Germany) play crucial roles (see also the 
Appendix, where the endowment effect of students in the UK (Table 9) becomes 
significant through the effect of ‘home educational resources’).  
Table 6: Estimation Results for Oaxaca Specification (12), Germany 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Math Scores Between Natives and Migrants 
( model specification: () ( ) () − =− + −+ nm n m n m nm
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n β -
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[0.693]         
-9.795    
 (12.290) 
[0.427] 
R - Squared  0.195 0.175 
Observations  177 177 
*Estimation Method: OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p - values in 
brackets.    24
 
Table 7: Estimation Results for Oaxaca Specification (12), UK 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Math Scores Between Natives and Migrants 
( model specification: () ( ) () − =− + −+ nm n m n m nm
s ss s s s PP XX X β ββ ε  ) 
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n β -
m β ) 
n β  (
n β -































11.446   








Share of More 














139.441   
















[0.721]     
10.557 
(10.356) 
[0.309]     
R - Squared  0.152 0.097 
Observations  202 202 
*Estimation Method: OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p - values in 
brackets.  
 
Some ‘return effect’ can only be observed for Germany. Here 
n β  on females 
significantly exceeds
m β by 45.6 when evaluated at
m
s X . As can be seen from previous 
results, females perform worse in maths than their male schoolmates. Table 6 reveals 
that at the within-school level, the generally poor math performance of females seems 
to be particularly low for migrants. At first glance, these results seem to be at odds 
with coefficients based on individual data, but it should be recalled that the coefficient 
is related to the mean of 
m
s X , and that educational achievement gaps estimated from 
individual data mainly stem from between school differences in Germany. As 
migrants in Germany mainly origin from Turkey and have strong religious roots as 
well as traditional roles, female students from these insufficiently integrated families 
not only lose ground on male schoolmates but also on their female native peers. It is 
exactly here that some effort by German educational and immigration policy is 
required to encourage girls and parents from such countries to break with the 
traditional roles of their home countries and to rouse their interests in mathematics 
(and other scientific and technical fields).   25
5. Summary and Conclusions 
The paper analyses the educational achievement of native and migrant students in 
Germany and the UK. Comparing these two countries is interesting for several 
reasons: First, although the UK is a European country, the ‘median migrant’ is 
different from for the typical ‘labour migrant’ in countries like Germany or France. 
She or he is better educated and the majority of immigrants originate from Western 
countries, contrary to the typical ‘guest worker’ in Germany who has Turkish roots or 
stems from Eastern countries. Second, schooling systems differ: Germany allocates 
students according to their skill level to separate schools at the early age of 10, 
whereas the UK mainly follows the concept of comprehensive schools. Third, in both 
countries intergenerational correlation of education is among the highest in Europe 
(Entorf and Minoiu, 2005).  
Given this institutional framework, the paper studies social interaction across and 
between the groups of natives and migrants using individual data on educational 
achievement (PISA, 2000, 2003, 2006). Results confirm that the question of peer 
effects cannot be disentangled from the influence of prevailing national schooling 
systems. Indeed, estimation results for migrants in Germany deviate from those of 
migrants in the UK in several respects, but there are some similarities, too: 
a)  As the English language poses no serious problem for the large majority of 
immigrants in the UK (contrary to the German language for migrants in 
Germany), it is perhaps not surprising that the language of the host country 
spoken at home (i.e. migrant parents speak German to migrant children) turns 
out being one of the most important factors of educational success for 
migrants in Germany, while this variable has no significant impact in the UK.  
b)  As far as the background of the parents is concerned, for the UK ‘more than 
100 books at home’ seems to be nicely suited for discriminating between 
advantaged students endowed with cultural capital from well educated 
families and less advantaged students from labour migrant families. Having 
‘more than 100 books at home’ or not has the effect of more than 30 PISA 
points. This variable is less relevant in Germany. Here, but also in the UK, the 
parental background is significantly covered by the factor ‘economic, social 
and cultural status’.  
c)  When inspecting the impact of ‘social interaction’ on educational 
achievement, the influence of the native peer group achievement is always 
higher than the influence of the migrant peer group, and the impact of native 
peers is higher in Germany than in the UK. The migrant-to-migrant 
propagation is more pronounced in the UK. In both countries the resulting size 
of the multiplier effect on natives is higher than the impact on migrants, with 
the multiplier of the German early tracking schooling system clearly 
exceeding the UK one. Evidently, multiplier effects magnify the prevailing   26
educational inequality between students entering schools, who have parents  
with a low parental socioeconomic migration background, and children from 
more privileged families, in particular in ability differentiated school systems 
(like Germany). 
The PISA initiative provides a rich set of explanatory variables, but consideration of 
unobserved heterogeneity is limited by the cross-sectional character of data. In order 
to mitigate the problem of unobserved factors, we consider differences between PISA 
scores of natives and migrants at the aggregate school level. At the same time, by 
taking the distance between natives’ and migrants’ educational achievements, we are 
going to analyse and evaluate factors that might increase or dampen educational 
inequality. It turns out that the share of females (results are based on maths 
performance (PISA 2006); here, girls perform worse than their male schoolmates) and 
the parental background (measured by ‘economic, social and cultural status’ and/or 
‘more than 100 books at home’) are confirmed as being significant.  
Employing the Oaxaca-Blinder specification, it turns out that the educational gap 
between natives and migrants is mainly due to the ‘endowment effect’ (i.e. the more 
advantaged socioeconomic background and the higher cultural capital of natives).   
Some ‘integration effect’ can only be observed for Germany, where female migrants 
seem to fall behind. We conclude that German educational and immigration policy 
should encourage girls with a migration background (typically from traditional 
Islamic countries) to break with traditional roles of home countries and to rouse their 
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A P P E N D I X 
 
Description of explanatory variables in equation (6) - baseline model: 
a) Individual characteristics and backgrounds of students 
- Mathematics Score: Students’ performance score in mathematics 
- Female: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the pupil is female  
- Grade 
For Germany: 
- Grade 8: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the pupil attends 8
th 
grade or lower  
- Grade 9: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the pupil attends 9
th 
grade  
- Grade 10: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the pupil attends 
10
th grade or 11
th  
For the UK: 
- Grade 11: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the pupil attends 
 
grade 11
th    29
-Foreignborn: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the pupil was not 
born in the country of test 
-National Language at Home: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
pupil deploys mostly (the) national language(s) or other national dialects at home  
-More than 100 Books at Home: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if 
the pupil reported having more than 100 books in his/ her home 
-Home Educational Resources: PISA 2006 Index of Home Educational Resources 
-Economic, Social and Cultural Status: PISA 2006 Index of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Status 
 
b) School-specific factors 
- Student-Teaching Staff Ratio: Total number of pupils divided by the total number 
of teachers (whereby part-time teachers are counted as one half of a full-time teacher) 
- Quality of School’s Educational Resources: Index of the quality of the school’s 
educational resources, derived from school principals’ reports on lack of instructional 
materials, laboratory equipment etc. concerning the learning by 15-year-olds  
- Village/ Small Town: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the school 
is located in a village or a small town (up to 15,000 people) 
- Selection by Residence: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
school very often or regularly considers residence in a particular area when students 
are admitted to the school 
- Selection by Performance: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
school very often or regularly considers the student's record of academic performance 
when students are admitted to the school 
-  Responsibility for Curriculum and Assessment: PISA 2006 Index for school’s 
Responsibility for Curriculum and Assessment as a measure of the school’s autonomy  
-  Responsibility for Resource Allocation: PISA 2006 Index for school’s 
Responsibility for Resource Allocation as a measure of the school’s autonomy 
- Public School: Binary Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the school is 
managed directly or indirectly by a government organisation 
- Mean of Mathematics Score: Mean of fellow - students’ performance scores in 
mathematics. The variable is calculated both as the mean of the maths score of natives 
and as the mean of the maths score of migrants.    30
Appendix 
 
Results for the alternative Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition: 
() ( ) () ( ) nm nm m n nm nm PP XX X s ss s s s s ββ β ε ε −=− + −+ − 
 
Table 8: Estimation Results for alternative Oaxaca Specification, Germany 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Math Scores Between Natives and Migrants 
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[0.693]         
-2.822    
 (12.795) 
[0.826] 
R - Squared  0.195 0.159 
Observations  177 177 
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Table 9: Estimation Results for alternative Oaxaca Specification, UK 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Math Scores Between Natives and Migrants 
( model specification:  () ( ) () ( ) nm nm m n nm nm PP XX X s ss s s s s ββ β ε ε −=− + −+ − ) 
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Share of More 














139.441   
















[0.721]     
5.243 
(12.022) 
[0.663]     
R - Squared  0.152 0.140 
Observations  202 202 
*Estimation Method: OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p - values in 
brackets. 
 